



POVERTY AND THE HIDDEN EFFECTS OF SEX DISCRIMINATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF INEQUALITY  
 





Sexist laws are more prevalent in regions where poverty is en-demic. The corollary is true as well:  the places where women tend to experience better treatment are typically more highly developed.  The legal academy has drawn several inferences from this observa-tion, including the observations that poverty and the development process appear to be detrimental to women’s rights.  But despite the strength of this relationship, few legal studies seek to under-stand precisely why gender inequality seems to be inextricably linked to poverty. Our research finds the opposite of what is generally assumed:  the act of depriving women of fundamental rights is the very cause of underdevelopment.  First, using a law and economic approach, sexist laws appear to create perverse behavioral incentives where-by actors rationally engage in inefficient behaviors.  This is because sexist laws, in contrast to other forms of discrimination, burden so-
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ciety's basic economic unit—the family.  For instance, regions that prohibit women from earning a wage depress the rate of invest-ment since single-income families must approach the market over-cautiously.  These deductions are then supported by an original empirical analysis, which indicates that gender inequality and poverty are significantly and powerfully connected.  Sexist laws are thus less the result of underdevelopment as much as its very cause.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Laws that discriminate against women are—on a global scale—vast and diverse.1  In developing countries, it is commonplace for statutes and rules to prohibit women from, among other things, owning land,2 inheriting property,3 obtaining education,4 and as-senting to contracts.5  Under Swaziland common law, for example, men have sole authority to administer marital property.6  When a 
                                                          
1 E.g., Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex Discriminatory Laws under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Dis-crimination against Women and through the Beijing Platform for action, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 19, 19 (2005) (“Wife obedience is mandated by law in Mali, and wife beating is permitted by law in Northern Nigeria.  Women, unlike men, do not have the right to vote in Kuwait, and under the laws of evidence in Pakistan, the attestation of a woman regarding financial obligations is worth half the attestation of a man.”).  See Engendering Development Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice, WORLD BANK 3 (2001) [hereinafter ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT] (stating that women almost always suffer from some level of economic deprivation, yet it is most prominent and visible in lesser developed countries).  See also Zainah Anwar & Jana S. Rumminger, Gender Relevant Legislative Change in Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries: Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Challenges, Possi-bilities, and Strategies for Reform, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1531 – 32 (2007) (stat-ing that not only are sexist laws most common in lesser-developed areas, but women also suffer a disproportionately large share of poverty and hardship).  See generally Audrey Rowe, The Feminization of Poverty:  An Issue for the 90s, 4 YALE L.J. 73 (1991) (discussing the concept of the “feminization of poverty,” which refers to the increasing margin by which women, relative to men, live in poverty). 
2 See Rachel Rebouche, Labor, Land, and Women’s Rights in Africa:  Challenges for the New Protocol on the Rights of Women, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 235, 244 – 45 (2006) (stating that in Kenya, it is presumed that marital property is exclusively owned by the husband, providing few legal rights to the wife).  
3 See Sarah J. Conroy, Women’s Inheritance and Conditionality in the Fight against AIDS, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 705, 706 (2011) (noting that in some areas women not only lack the right to inherit, but are actually deemed property that can be inherited by male relatives). 
4 See generally Erika George, Instructions in Inequality: Development, Human Rights, Capabilities, and Gender Violence in Schools, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1139 (2005) (describing the situations in which girls, particularly in the developing world, lack quality education). 
5 Brenda Oppermann, The Impact of Legal Pluralism on Women’s Status:  An Ex-amination of Marriage Laws in Egypt, South African, and the United States, 17 HASTINGS WOM. L.J. 65, 70 (2006). 
6 See Sihlongonyane v. Sihlongonyane, C.N. 470/2013A 1, 8 – 9 (2013) available at http://www.swazilii.org/sz/judgment/high-court/2013/144-0 [https://perma.cc/8ACW-D42E] (citing HR HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE, 161 (5th ed. 1985) in a case involving allegations that a wom-an’s husband transferred significant amounts of marital property to his mistress-es.  This was his right by virtue of being a man under Swazi law; “It is by virtue of 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss4/2
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Swazi woman recently sought to challenge this regulation in Sihlongonyane v. Sihlongonyane,7 the Swazi Supreme Court was un-able to rule on the case’s merits due to another law barring a wom-an from initiating lawsuits without her husband’s permission.8  Since Mr. Sihlongonyane had refused to bless Mrs. Sihlongonya-ne’s petition, she lacked legal standing to contest his handling, and squandering, of their estate.9  Notably, Swaziland is like most other places that deny women substantive rights: underdeveloped and deeply impoverished.10  The countries in which women suffer the lowest standards of de-velopment and greatest levels of discrimination are primarily the world’s poorest.11  According to the United Nations’ data, eight of the bottom ten countries for underdevelopment are also in the bot-tom ten for gender inequality.12  It is generally assumed that certain aspects of poverty impede women’s rights,13 which the develop-ment process further aggravates.14  But how accurate is this expla-nation?  Considering the dearth of scholarship studying the behav-
                                                                                                                                    
the marital power that the husband assumes the office of administrator of the joint estate, and the wife finds herself subordinated to his guardianship, bereft of active legal capacity…”) (internal citation omitted). 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 17 (stating that the petitioner urged the court to strip her husband of exclusive authority while “aver[ing] further that she is fully capable and fit to properly administer the… estate.”  Furthermore, “[w]hilst it is accepted that in terms of the common law, a married woman who is subject to the marital power may approach the court for leave to sue without the aid of her husband—venia agenda… A married man does not, under any circumstances, have to apply for such leave.”). 
9 Id. at 6 – 7.  
10 The World Bank found that for much of the decade around two-thirds of Swaziland lived below the poverty line.  Life expectancy is a paltry 49 years and the per capital income is $3,080, which is actually significantly better than most other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.  World Development Indicator Data for the country of Swaziland, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/swaziland [https://perma.cc/37Z7-97PQ] (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 
11 Infra section II. 
12 Gender Inequality Index, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ6N-LRNT] (2013). 
13 See, e.g., Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, Constitutional Claims for Gender Equality in South Africa: A Judicial Response, 67 ALB. L. REV. 565, 568 (2003) (explaining that certain inequalities from which women suffer increase the rate in which women live in poverty). 
14 See infra notes 66 – 70 and accompanying text. 
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ioral incentives associated with gender inequality,15 this article in-vestigates why sexist laws are most prevalent in areas where pov-erty is endemic.  Or, in so many words, what is the law and eco-nomics of sex discrimination? Using an original dataset, advanced quantitative methods, and a law and economics approach, this article uncovers a powerful and counterintuitive dynamic:  poverty often thrives precisely be-cause of laws that discriminate against women.  As will be ex-plained, the family functions as society’s foundational economic unit, providing an efficient means for actors to participate in the market.16  But, in contrast to other forms of discrimination, gender inequality undermines the family structure, discouraging both men and women from engaging in productive economic behaviors.17  For instance, prohibiting women from earning a wage depresses the rate of investment since single-income families must then ap-proach the market over-cautiously.  Sexist laws are not just tangen-tially related to global poverty but instead one of its greatest de-terminants.  This article seeks to make several contributions.  On a practical level, our findings indicate that attempts to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment must account for the deleterious effects of sex discrimination.  Theoretically, this article contributes to the law and economics literature, including a discussion of how sexist legal codes and regulations of the family structure render deleterious behavioral incentives.  We also hope that our dataset can support future research projects in light of this subject’s current lack of da-ta.18  But the biggest takeaway is likely our finding that increasing women’s rights fulfills more than justice; it is also good business.                                                           
15 See Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: the Failure and Postmodern Possi-bilities of International Law, VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503, 591 (2000) (arguing that the literature has ignored substantial issues of women’s economic justice, which is a much greater concern to impoverished women than some human rights issues that have been more keenly examined).  See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, The Façade of Neutrality: Uncovering Gender Silences in International Trade, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 115 – 17 (2008). 
16 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 183 (8th ed. 2011) (ex-plaining that the family serves as an economic unit, allowing its members to oper-ate efficiently). 
17 Infra Section 3 (discussing how actors must consider not only themselves but also their families when making economic decisions.  Laws that discriminate by sex have the effect of disrupting the manner in which decide to spend, save, and invest). 
18 Stark, supra note 15, at 526. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss4/2
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Section II discusses the pervasiveness of legally sanctioned sex discrimination, detailing how certain laws deprive women of eco-nomic and legal rights.  Special emphasis is given to perhaps the most unforgiving legal code, African customary law.  This is fol-lowed by a law and economics analysis in Section III, which can-vasses the effects of sex discrimination and the process by which it frustrates economics growth and development.  Section IV pre-sents empirical research, suggesting that women must gain eco-nomic equality or else underdevelopment and poverty will persist.  This article then concludes with several policy prescriptions.  
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
 Gender inequality is ultimately a legal problem.19  The degree to which women suffer from discrimination is typically the prod-uct, or failure, of certain statutes, common law rules, and even in-ternational legal authorities.20  And considering the prevalence of 
                                                          
19 See Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women’s Human Rights, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 125, 126 (1994) (noting the comparative deprivation of women, stemming from discriminatory legal codes).  See generally Judith Resnick, Opening the Door: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Law’s Boundaries, and the Gender of Opportu-nities, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 81 (2013) (explaining the nexus between the law and sex discrimination). 
20 The role of international law and authorities are particularly important in understanding the pervasiveness of global gender inequality.  Cook, supra note 19, at 126.  Sovereign states may enact and enforce sexist laws with little resistance from the international community.  The international community considers gen-der discrimination to be a nation’s prerogative, refusing to pass meaningful re-forms potentially in tension with a country’s sovereignty.  This landscape is espe-cially notable considering the international community’s more fervent opposition to racial discrimination.  See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, A “Benign Apartheid: How Gen-der Apartheid Has Been Rationalized”,  5 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 237, 239 (2000) (noting that the international community has relatively ignored issues of gender discrimination, relative to racial discrimination); Celestine Nyamu, How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 391 – 392 (2000) (finding that, “the minimal presence of women’s rights NGOs in rural areas, where the issue of land has greater significance, perpetuates the political/economic rights dichoto-my.”); Stark, supra note 15, at 531 – 32 at 535: 
[I]nternational law has failed women in at least two distinct ways, both grounded in its failure to fully and effectively incorporate human rights law. First, on the state level, it has failed to prevent the widespread dep-rivation of human rights, caused by shredded safety nets, environmental degradation, and other byproducts of globalization, or to alleviate the re-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
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sexist laws in impoverished areas, the occurrence of gender ine-quality seems to be far from coincidental.21  This section examines the nature of sexist laws to shed light on their effects on economic behavior.  And as will be shown, some societies enforce legal codes, and even entire bodies of law, that can best be described as holistic efforts to subjugate women, rendering profound systemic consequences.  
                                                                                                                                    
sultant human suffering… Second, international law has failed to compel even the most basic recognition of human rights on the part of the Major Players, that is, non-state actors who are in fact the principal agents of globalization. 
Furthermore, the primary, and virtually only, international law regime governing women’s rights is the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  Id. at 544.  Certain CEDAW provisions ostensibly obligate countries to replace discriminatory laws with those guaranteeing women equal rights.  Two specific provisions, Articles 2(f) and 5(a), instruct member states to supplant discriminatory laws and practices with mod-ernized institutions prescribing egalitarian treatment.  But see Nyamu, at 391 – 92 (finding that the accord lacks authority to compel signatories, allowing certain member states—most of which being the worst offenders—to carve out exceptions to key articles; “[m]any Third World states, especially those with an Islamic ma-jority, have, however, made reservations to these articles.”); Neuwirth, supra note 1, at 25 (“many parties have ratified CEDAW with reservations specifically in-tended to protect them from the obligations to repeal sex discriminatory laws in force at the domestic level.”); see also Ann Laquer Estin, Religious and Legal Plural-ism in Comparative Theoretical Perspective: Family Law, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 811, 818 (2011) (noting the countries that refused to ratify parts of the CEDAW using language of gender equality).  Although a few other intergovernmental organizations—such as the World Bank’s Engendering Devel-opment program— have sought to bind member states to promoting gender equality, the same problems regarding the lack of enforceability persist.  See Rit-tich, infra note 71, at 584 (“Engendering Development attempts to present a coher-ent, if flexible, vision of gender equality, one that is organized around ensuring ‘basic’ rights and enhancing women’s market skills and promoting greater voice.  Yet there are multiple Lacunae and instabilities in the vision of equality it advanc-es, and numerous possible points of engagement with its claims.”). 
21 Many of the countries rated as the poorest also provide women with the worst quality of life and the fewest substantive rights.  One Newsweek study ranked every country based on women’s access to justice, health, education, eco-nomic rights, and political rights.  The worst countries for women’s rights were highly correlated with the International Monetary Fund’s listing of countries that have the lowest gross domestic product per capita.  For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was considered the poorest country in the world and the third worst for women.  Other countries that topped both lists include Niger, Af-ghanistan, Mali, and Ethiopia.  Best Countries for Women Full List, NEWSWEEK/DAILY BEAST, http://www.scribd.com/doc/65645520/Best-Countries-for-Women-Full-List [https://perma.cc/234J-GCCW] (Sept 20, 2011); Data and Statistics, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm [https://perma.cc/7THH-CBVZ] (Last visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
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The most common and debilitating types of sexist laws dis-criminate against women in the workplace and home.22  Notable examples include a Latin American labor law that allows employ-ers to terminate, or resist hiring, a pregnant woman after adminis-tering a compulsory pregnancy testing.23  Similarly, the Russian Federation enforces an employment statute that prohibits women from working any job found on a list of over 450 occupations re-quiring physical labor or ostensibly lacking femininity.24  Chinese employers pay women on average of about 60-70% of male wages for the same work.25  And critics allege that American employment laws fail to protect women against certain abuses from which men do not usually suffer.26   
                                                          
22 See generally Mayabanza S. Bangudi, Recognizing Humanity: Achieving Inter-national Gender Equality in Labor Employment, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 147 (2005) (de-scribing the problems women have globally in the work place). 
23 See Jennifer M. Swedish, The SETISA Factory: Mandatory Pregnancy Testing Violates the Human Rights of Honduran Maquila Workers, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 363, 364 (2005) (finding that Honduran women are routinely forced by their em-ployers to take pregnancy tests at the time of employment and then afterward. Women found to have become pregnant were fired).  See also Elizabeth Georgen, Women Workers in Mexico: Using the International Human Rights Framework to Achieve Labor protection, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 414 (2008) (describing the employ-ment abuse of pregnant Mexican laborers). 
24 Russia’s barrier preventing women from working certain jobs entailing “hard, physical” work was challenged by woman who sought to become a St. Pe-tersburg metro driver.  This job was deemed inherently dangerous and unfit for women.  In challenging the statute, the Russian Supreme Court upheld the prohi-bition, noting it complied with all applicable standards and conventions set forth by the International Labor Organization.  Alexander Marquardt, Why Can’t Rus-sian Women Drive Buses?, ABC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/International/russian-women-drive-buses/story?id=8220576 [https://perma.cc/HM32-4D9K]; Supreme Court Disallows Women from Being Subway Motormen, LIVE J., Mar. 2, 2009, http://russian-law.livejournal.com/23684.html [https://perma.cc/QY3Q-WCSK].  See Jessica Golloher, Russian Woman Continues Fight for Equal Rights to Employment, 51 VOA, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.51voa.com/VOA_Standard_English/VOA_Standard_English_34419.html [https://perma.cc/SDV2-4ZD5]. 
25 See Ronald C. Brown, China’s Employment Discrimination During Economic Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 364 (2006) (for instance, female doctors are typically paid about 63% of what male Chinese doctors earn). 
26 See Cary Franklin, Inventing the ‘Traditional Concept of Sex Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2012) (outlining the problems with Title VII).  See also Su-zanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 731 – 33 (2011) (discussing how women often have difficulties proving sex discrimination claims because most courts demand sex that these suits identify other employees who received the same and disparate treatment due to their sex). 
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Likewise, under various bodies of family law, a woman who enters marriage stands to lose her citizenship, unable to pass such rights onto her children.27  Women in some Middle Eastern coun-tries cannot assent to their own marriages28 and, under Malaysian law, a wife can lose her right to economic support if she disobeys her husband.29  A Chinese divorce statute effectively vests title of a former couple’s marital property in the man’s name exclusively,30 and it was not until recently when Ugandan women gained the right to file for divorce without having to prove certain limited and extreme factors.31  In fact, some places, including Nigeria, permit domestic violence, literally allowing men to beat their wives into compliance.32  While sexist laws can operate independently as a discrete means to discriminate, some legal codes entail holistic efforts to deprive women of substantive rights.  African customary law falls 
                                                          
27 Stephanie Palo, Citizens after Marriage:  Exploring Violations of Women’s Na-tionality Rights, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 673, 674 (2009); see Lisa C. Stratton, Note, The Right to Have Rights: Gender Discrimination in Nationality Laws, 77 MINN. L. REV. 195, 196 – 97  (1992) (finding that depriving women of the right to pass citizenship to their offspring severely limits the rights of both mothers and children);  
28 Oppermann, supra note 5, at 70. 
29 Zainah Anwar & Jana S. Rumminger, Gender Relevant Legislative Change in Muslim and Non-Muslim Countries: Justice and Equality in Muslim Family Laws: Chal-lenges, Possibilities, and Strategies for Reform, 64 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1531 (2007). 
30 Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Chinese Women’s Progress Stalls on Many Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/world/asia/chinese-womens-progress-stalls-in-varied-standards.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TH9H-S9WW] (describing how women often give their hus-bands “face,” titling all marital property in his name, but then under Chinese mar-ital law, such property reverts to its legal owner upon a divorce, effectively de-priving women of their share of marital purpose). 
31 See The Ugandan Association of Women Lawyers and Others v. The Attorney General, Const. Petitions Nos. 13/05/ & 05/06 [2007] UGCC 1 at 10 – 11 (Uganda), available at http://www.saflii.org/ug/cases/UGCC/ 2007/1.rtf [https://perma.cc/AM6B-MX3K] (stating that a Ugandan woman’s right to divorce was limited only to instances of “desertation, rape, bigamy, or sodomy.”  The Ugandan Su-preme Court overruled the statute, finding that it unreasonably upheld archaic gender stereotypes and roles).  Africa’s Women’s Rights Observatory, U.N. ECON. COMM’N AFRICA, http://www1.uneca.org/awro/awro_databank.aspx [https://perma.cc/FJ85-KFZT] (last visited Mar. 12, 2015). 
32 See, e.g., Neuwirth, supra note 1, at 19 (citing legalized wife beating in North Nigeria).  See also Alice Edwards, Violence Against Women as Sex Discrimina-tion: Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 44 (2008) (assessing violence against women as sex discrimi-nation). 
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into this category.  Most African nations are home to a number of diverse ethnic groups, most of which enforce their own independ-ent legal systems known as “customary law.”33  These institutions are non-statutory bodies of law, found mainly in rural areas, pos-sessing the same authority as, and existing alongside of, codified laws.34  While customary law helps to protect certain longstanding traditions,35 it also deprives women of fundamental rights.  For in-stance, customary law assumes that women require caretaking and protection,36 deeming women to be the property of their husbands or fathers.37  A woman’s possessions are thus controlled by such family member for her custodial benefit,38 barring female owner-ship of most personal goods except for clothing.39  African scholar, Marjoleine Benschop, cited the story of a Ugandan farmer who, while likening his wife to a tractor, wondered how she could own property if she, herself, was property.40  Even in matrilineal Ghana, a husband may leverage his wife as collateral for a loan.41  In some countries such as Tanzania, a woman can be purchased for mar-riage at the cost of chickens and livestock.42                                                           
33 JM, Pienaar, Broadening access to land: The Case of African Rural Women in South Africa, J.S. AFR. L. 177, 178 (2002). 
34 Id. at 178 (“Customary law is recognized by the courts and exists as a sec-ond body of law (in addition to statutory law) governing citizens in the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. It has the greatest control over people in rural areas . . . ”).  See also Amrita Kapur, “Catch-22”: The Role of Development Institutions in Promoting Gender Equality in Land Law—lessons Learned in Post-Conflict Pluralist Africa, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS L. REV. 75, 88 (“These customary traditions have evolved inde-pendently from, and often in contradiction to, state institutions.  Compounding this plurality of authority” is weak institutional knowledge.). 
35 S.F. Joireman, infra note 70, at, 1235. 
36 See Pienaar, supra note 33, at 183 (“[A] daughter was always under the guardianship of her father and a wife was always under the guardianship of her husband. Guardianship under customary law affected all decisions regarding property, land, and ownership.”). 
37 Id. at 36. 
38 See S.F. Joireman, infra note 70, at 1239. 
39 Id. at 1238. 
40 See Marjolein Benschop, Women’s Rights to Land and Property, U.N. RULE OF LAW (2004), available at http://www.unrol.org/files/womensrightstolandandproperty.pdf (mentioning that the Ugandan farmer “compared his wife with a tractor, how could she (co-) own property if she herself was (seen as) his proper-ty.”). 
41 MICHAEL KEVANE, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: HOW GENDER WORKS 31 – 32 (2004). 
42 See Rachel C. Loftspring, Inheritance Rights in Uganda: How Equal Rights Would Reduce Poverty and Decrease the Spread of HIV/AIS in Uganda, 29 U. PA. J. 
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The concept of women as property likewise bars African wom-en from owning real property.43  African regional leaders distribute available community land to local clans with each family’s male head as the ultimate beneficiary;44 because customary law consid-ers women unfit to own real estate, a woman who receives land from her family’s patriarch is barred from registering it in her own name.45  While women may use land to farm, only a man can alien-ate it on the market or otherwise exploit its economic potential.46   Furthermore, under most customary intestacy and inheritance laws, when an African woman is widowed, her husband’s real 
                                                                                                                                    
INT’L L. 243, 252 (2007) (“[T]he payment of a bride price is akin to purchasing property, giving a man full ownership over his wife.  The payment of bride price demeans a woman's status by encouraging men to conceive of their wives as chat-tel…’  After being purchased, women often feel subservient to their husbands, who can do as they wish with their wives.  Men may pay for their wives uses sev-eral means of payment including chickens and livestock.”)  (alterations in origi-nal).  See also Women are Not Men, FREAKONOMICS RADIO (Feb. 14, 2013), http://freakonomics.com/2013/02/24/women-are-not-men-a-new-freakonomics-radio-podcast/ [https://perma.cc/9NQV-MW4S] (stating that in the Maasi Tribe in Tanzania, the cost of a woman is about ten cows, making wives the property of their husbands). 
43 See Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 (noting that women generally have less control over land due to societal perceptions that women lack the ability to make decisions regarding land use and are typically not entitled to shares of land upon marital dissolution).  
44 See Pienaar, supra note 33, at 179 – 180 (explaining that the chiefs or head-men of tribes can grant land to individual families and that the head of the family, the male member, is the one who decides how received land is used by the fami-ly); see also Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 (discussing the concept of “male head of household” as the criterion used for land title registration). 
45 See Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 (“Women are regarded as lacking the au-thority to make major decisions concerning land use and cannot inherit land or acquire a share of land following marital dissolution if they were married under customary law . . . African customary laws are used as the primary justification for this exclusion of women: national land registration programs have replicated these socio-cultural conventions.  Using the concept of ‘male head of household’ as the criterion for title registration, most, if not all, title to registered land is indi-vidually held in men’s names.”). 
46 See Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact of Privatization on Gender and Property Rights in Africa, 25 WORLD DEV. 1317, 1321 (1997) (stating that “men control household land because the community authorities have allocated the land to male household heads; these lands are then passed down to male heirs.”); see also Pienaar, supra note 33, at 179 – 180 (“For most women, access to land depends on their relation to male relatives and the specific laws and practices of the area.  Alt-hough a husband has an obligation to provide arable land to his wife to farm and decide which specific piece of land the woman can use for how long.”). 
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property passes only to male relatives.47  This causes devastating effects when a man dies before his widow bears his child since the family inheriting the deceased’s property often evicts the widow.48  Widow evictions are commonplace to the degree that an African social movement endeavors to help widows remain in their former homes.49  In fact, some African countries statutorily permit widow discrimination; for example, Zimbabwe’s Customary Law and Primary Courts Act formally bequeaths property along traditional lines to men only.50  That said, a few African Supreme Court cases have recently taken a different approach. South Africa declared in Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate51 that national intestacy laws may no longer bypass women for the sake of more remote male rela-tives.52 Importantly, the act of limiting primary property rights dimin-ishes critical secondary economic rights.53  Barring female owner-ship of real property, for instance, prevents women from pos-sessing collateral to leverage.54  Indeed, since those who own few 
                                                          
47 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 46, at 1321 – 1328.  
48 Benschop, supra note 40 (discussing various causes and issues associated with the widespread prevalence of widow evictions). 
49 See Africa’s Homeless Widows, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/16/opinion/africa-s-homeless-widows.html [https://perma.cc/ASQ9-DE83] (mentioning that African civil rights movements have targeted inheritance laws that have long treated women as minors, unable to inherit property.  And also, considering the increased mortality rate of men due to AIDs, widowed women have been evicted from their homes by their husband’s family and left homeless). 
50 No. 6, § 3(4) (1981) (Zimb.). 
51 Bhe & Others v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha & Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
52 UNISA UNIT FOR GENDER RESEARCH IN LAW, WOMEN AND THE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA: EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ENLIGHTENMENT 40 – 42 (1998) (remarking that the South African Supreme Court found in three cases that the Black Administra-tion Act unfairly deprived women of inheritance rights when, for example, a de-ceased father’s property bypassed his daughters so that male cousins took in-stead). But see Maxine Langwena, Historic Step Towards Equality for Swazi Women:  An Analysis of Mary-Joyce Aphane v. The Registrar of Deeds, OPEN DEBATE, 1, 3 – 4 (2012), http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/open_debate_6_-_doo_aphane_v_registrar.pdf [https://perma.cc/7STK-AF39] (discussing Aphane v. the Regis-trar of Deeds, where Swaziland’s Supreme Court ordered the legislature to redraft the national land titling systems to permit female registration of real property). 
53 See, e.g., Nyamu, supra note 20, at 397 (explaining that abridging some pri-mary rights has consequential effects on other economic rights).   
54 Nyamu, supra note 20, at 397 (“Without evidence of land ownership, wom-en cannot offer adequate collateral to secure a loan.”); see also Janet M. Sawaya, 
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assets can rarely obtain loans or other forms of credit, the ability of African women to invest, among other marketplace activities, is severely limited.55  The UN’s African Women’s Report determined that the resources available to African women constitutes only for-ty-four percent of those available to men, illustrating the barriers women face in seeking to improve their social and market stand-ings.56  Although most African constitutions ostensibly guarantee women equal protection, a number of African supreme courts have held that constitutional protections apply only to statutory laws, as opposed to customary laws.57  In Magaya v. Magaya,58 a Zimbabwe-an court affirmed that “a lady… cannot be appointed [as heir] to [her] father's estate when there is a man” on the grounds that cus-tomary law is not subject to constitutional guarantees.59  Other 
                                                                                                                                    
Rights Education As A Means Of Economic Empowerment For Women In Sub-Saharan Africa, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 329, 330 (1995) (“Without control, access, or the ability to exploit economic resources, women are not able to improve their economic statuses… Thus, each denial of an economic right gives rise to another denial and ensures women have continued economic dependence.”). 
55 Nyamu, supra note 20, at 397 (citing as an example how “women are often denied a share of marital property after divorce since title to their property is held in their husband’s name.  Th[is] male bias in land registration also impedes ob-taining independent credit.”). 
56 ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AFRICAN WOMEN’S REPORT 2009: MEASURING GENDER INEQUALITY IN AFRICA: EXPERIENCES AND LESSONS FROM THE AFRICAN GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT INDEX (“Cases where the family is headed by a female account for 59% of all African families classified as poor… in practice it is usually the women (who have the primary responsibility of taking care of the family) who inevitably bear the burden of poverty.”). 
57 See Valerie Knobelsdorf, Zimbabwe’s Magaya Decision Revisited: Women’s Rights and Land Succession in the International Court, 15 COLUM J. GENDER & L. 749 (2006) (describing legal decision making as a “delicate balancing process” between consti-tutional and international law and the strong legal protections for cultural practices); David M. Bigge & Amelie von Briesen, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Women's Rights and Indigenous Self-determination in Magaya v. Magaya, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 295 (2000) (discussing the aftermath of the Magaya v. Magaya case and its implications for using constitutional law to further women’s rights objectives).   
58  (1999) 3 L.R.C. 40 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.). 
59 See Knobelsdorf, supra note 57, at 750 – 51 (discussing a case in which an appellate court denied a women the right to inherit due to her sex for her younger half-brother, who relegated her to a shack in the neighbor’s yard).  But see In re Wachokire, (2002) Succession Cause No. 192 of 2000, Int’l Assoc. of Women Judg-es, http://www.iawj.org/JEPcases.html [https://perma.cc/KJ2C-P9NF] (last vis-ited Mar. 12, 2015) (discussing a Kenyan woman who was awarded a minority share of her father’s land because “under Kikuyu customary law, an unmarried woman like Watiri lacked equal inheritance rights because of the expectation that 
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courts have refused to use constitutional grounds to unsettle cus-tomary law out of fear that local authorities would ignore such rul-ings, undermining the constitution.60  This occurred in Stephen and Another v. Attorney General,61 in which a Tanzanian court upheld that women are barred from selling family land in order to guaran-tee the “sacrosanct nature of the constitution.”62  It thus appears that, despite the clarity of the Tanzanian constitution, the judiciary feared that trumping customary law would serve only to embar-rass its constitution.  Curiously, in light of the prevalence of sexist laws, it is seldom questioned why discrimination is more prominent in places where underdevelopment and poverty levels are elevated.63  We find, as the next section demonstrates, that sexist laws create unique bur-dens on the family structure, rendering perverse incentive struc-tures whereby actors rationally engage in economically inefficient behaviors.  Gender inequality is, indeed, not just tenuously related to global poverty, but one of its greatest determinants.  
                                                                                                                                    
she would get married.”  The appellate court overruled, holding that the trial court’s decision violated the Kenyan constitution as well as CEDAW). 
60 Sibongile Ndashe & Solomon Sacco, Watch the Courts Dance: Litigating the Right to Non-Discrimination on the Ground of Sex, 4 EQUAL RTS. REV. 1, 30 (2009), http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/Ndashe&Sacco.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9L-RHHD]. 
61 Sibongile Ndashe & Solomon Sacco, Watch the Courts Dance: Litigating the Right to Non-discrimination on the Ground of Sex, 4 EQUAL RTS. REV. 26, 29 – 30 (2009) (citing Miscellaneous Civil Cause 82 of 2005 [Tanz.]).  See also Judica Murimo, Tanzania: Court throws out petition…, WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS, http://www.wluml.org/node/3178 [https://perma.cc/GW8J-BMWP] (detailing the court’s rejection of the petition despite arguments that the customary laws vio-lated the Constitution and international human rights obligations).  
62 Ndashe & Sacco, supra note 60, at 30. 
63 For example, in light of African customary law, The Economist reported that “only 15% of Africans today live in an environment considered minimally ade-quate for sustainable growth and development,” and nearly half of Africa resides in poverty.  The Heart of the Matter, THE ECONOMIST (May 13, 2000), http://www.economist.com/node/333437 [https://perma.cc/9EZP-PUT7].  The lack of development is equally alarming since a majority of African economies de-clined from 1975 – 1990 while only two nations displayed growth exceeding two percent.  MICHAEL KEVANE, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: HOW GENDER WORKS, 10 (2004). 
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3. WOMEN, SEXIST LAWS, AND POVERTY:  A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
  A law and economics perspective can provide key insights into gender inequality and poverty’s relationship by emphasizing the manner in which actors rationally respond to sexist laws.  Pre-viously the legal academy has produced several notable findings on the subject, primarily from the law and development and gen-der and law literatures.  For instance, the latter field notes that poverty disproportionally affects women, commonly referred to as the “feminization of poverty.”64  In impoverished regions, women generally earn less, have fewer rights, suffer worse health issues, and are more likely to become victims of violence, among other so-cial and economic ills.65  But while this research offers important insights, it tends to explore the manner in which gender inequality influences poverty in women and less its overall impact on society.   Moreover, the law and development field66 primarily studies law and democracy’s influence on societal growth, giving less at-tention to the role of gender equality.67  And the works that do in-corporate women’s rights tend to assume that changes in gender 
                                                          
64 See Ann R. Tickamyer, Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial Di-mensions of Women’s Poverty and Welfare in the United States, 84 KY. L.J. 721, 725 (1996) (providing examples of why women are more likely to be trapped in pov-erty: “Most mainstream and feminist social scientists currently agree that the ma-jor factors responsible for women's poverty arise from a complex mix of economic disadvantage in the labor market and disproportionate responsibility for repro-ductive labor or the caregiving responsibilities that traditionally make up wom-en's work”). 
65 ‘Dejo Olowu, Human Development Challenges in Africa: A Rights-Based Ap-proach, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 179, 186 – 87 (2004) (describing the health challenges women face, relative to men, in addition to other important issues). 
66 See, e.g., Thom Ringer, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Pre-scriptions for a Common Understanding of the ‘Rule of Law’ and its Place in Develop-ment Theory and Practice, 10 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 178, 179 (2007) (discussing na-tional and international efforts to promote the rule of law in hopes of inspiring development); see also Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 365 – 66 (2007) (explaining the role of the law in the law and development literature: “Law and development remains a priority for traditional development organizations such as the World Bank, as secure property and contract rights are deemed neces-sary for the development of a robust, rule bound market. Even charitable NGOs such as Oxfam… generally acknowledge that a working market (and the rule of law necessary to support it) is imperative for poverty reduction.”). 
67 But see Cao supra note 66, at 367 – 68 (discussing the relationship between women’s rights and development).  
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equality are the results of certain development policies including trade liberalization,68 though disagreements persist about whether such policies harm or help women.69  But despite the strength of these studies, it is seldom considered whether the nature of wom-en’s position in society is driving the relationship;70 in other words, 
                                                          
68 See id. (discussing the relationship between women’s rights and develop-ment, but assuming “that economic development, in the long run, translates into better protection for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of human rights treaties.”); Apodaca, infra note 169, at 160 (“All statistical tests support the conclusion that economic development has a positive effect on women’s equality in the enjoyment of economic and social rights.”); Lyndsay J. Montour, Connecting the Spheres of Trade and Gender: Creating a Gender-Conscious World Trade Organization, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 397, 400 (2014) (“While trade liber-alization does not cause gender inequality, increased trade can significantly change a country’s economic conditions, intensifying existing gender-based ine-qualities.”). 
69 There is a significant debate in the law and development field about the manner in which the development process affects women’s rights.  Some find that the process empowers the men currently in charge.  See Nyamu, supra note 20, at 396 (explaining that the marketization and commodification of certain facets of the economy, such as land ownership, tend to hurt women in the developing world relative to men, especially male relatives); Nandini Gunewardena, Rein-scribing Subalternity: International Financial Institutions, Development, and Women’s Marginality, 7 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 201, 208 (2003) (arguing that most lib-eral economic development plans implemented by organizations such as the In-ternational Monetary Fund further “colonializes” women in the developing world); S.F. Joireman, The Mystery of Capital Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Wom-en, Property Rights and Customary Law, 36 WORLD DEV. 1233, 1238 (2008) (stating that modernizing land titling systems in Africa could put women in a worse place than under customary law systems because this transition may strip them of the few benefits of the land that they presently enjoy); Mahmood Monshipouri, Pro-moting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating Developing Countries, 4 YALE H.R. & DEV. L.J. 25, 42 (2001) (stating that structural adjustment programs “have routinely imposed unbearable and unjust burdens on the most powerless people of the developing world: women”); Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Sex and Globalization, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 173, 174 (2008) (discussing the dispropor-tionate negative social conditions suffered by women and how this can be exacer-bated by globalization and economic development).  Other works note that wom-en benefit as societies become more developed.  See Eric Neumayer, Globalization, Women’s Economic Rights and Forced Labor, WORLD ECON. 1510, 1531 (2007) (“Our quantitative analysis of a global sample size suggests that women in countries that are more open to trade enjoy better economic rights and there is less inci-dence of forced labor in countries more integrated into global markets than in countries that are more closed.”); Cao supra note 66, at 366 (discussing the correla-tion between women’s rights and development, but assuming “that economic de-velopment, in the long run, translates into better protection for human rights than other indicators, such as ratification by states of human rights treaties.”). 
70 See, e.g., Kerry Rittich, Transformed Pursuits: The Quest for Equality in Global-ized Markets, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 231, 254 – 55 (finding that market transfor-mations seeking privatization and liberalization often times harm women).  But 
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most view porous women’s rights as the effect of poverty and not its cause.  Maybe—as our theoretical treatment and empirical analysis suggest—promoting gender equality spurs growth while subjugat-ing women might actually frustrate development.   
3.1. The Economics of Laws that Discriminate against Women 
 We demonstrate, using a law and economics approach,71 that sexist laws encourage actors, both men and women, to adopt be-haviors that hinder development.  While it is generally understood that discrimination makes little economic sense,72 we find that gender inequality is unique because it undermines how families participate in the marketplace.  Fundamentally, the family struc-ture operates akin to a business because it allows actors to exploit numerous firm-level benefits, including economies of scale (e.g., buying products more cheaply in bulk), divisions of labor, and ac-
                                                                                                                                    
see Okezie Chukwumerije, Peer Review and the Promotion of Good Governance in Afri-ca, 32 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 49, 96 (2006) (mentioning in short that “African women have historically suffered from marginalization in term of their legal rights, educational opportunities, participating in public life, and participation in economic life.  This has had an adverse effect both on the material conditions of African women and also on the overall economy of the continent.”).  
71 An economics approach is useful because it assesses societal institutions in a manner that explains aggregate group behavior, producing predictions about systemic (in)efficiencies.  At its heart, economics assumes that actors behave ra-tionally, meaning that they tend to choose strategies from all available options, which likely produce the greatest benefits while minimizing costs.  How an actor assesses these costs and benefits is dependent upon the institutions under which one operates.  If large groups of actors operate under similar conditions, they will likely behave similarly.  Gender inequality is often the product of institutions to which rational actors conform their behaviors, producing predictable results. 
72 Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 183, 188 n. 28 (1993) (“Racial discrimination results in highly inefficient uses of society’s human resources. Tolerating racial discrimination is tantamount to condoning a type of economic waste.”).  For a specific example in the context of lending, see generally, Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lend-ing Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995).  In summary, this article states that because bankers are motivated by earning profit, they should loan money when the transaction is likely profitable.  Evidence sug-gests, however, that some bankers deny loans to African-Americans when they otherwise would loan money to white borrowers.  Therefore, discrimination makes little sense because some bankers are foregoing making loans even when traditional quantitative indicators suggest that such loans would be profitable.  
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tivity specialization.73  In fact, conceptualizing the family as a busi-ness undermines a bedrock assumption of economics whereby ac-tors are autonomous and unitary (meaning that an actor’s decision-making calculus considers only one’s own individual preferences, costs, and benefits).74  Instead most people participate in the market as part of a family, making choices with the intent of maximizing collective wealth and wellbeing.75  For example, the decision of whether to accept a job in another city is often predicated on fac-tors such as whether one’s children can enroll in an adequate school or one’s spouse may earn a satisfactory wage.  Thus the family structure frames how most people perceive the market and contemplate economic transactions. However, laws diminishing female economic rights change the costs and benefits of the family structure by placing obstacles in front of those who would otherwise choose to invest or participate in the market.  This is problematic because investment is the life-blood of growing economies—and even stable ones.76  Since deci-
                                                          
73 POSNER, supra note 16, at 183 (“The persistence of the family as a social in-stitution suggests to an economist that it must have important economizing prop-erties.”). 
74 Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1169 – 70 (2010) (“According to standard law and econom-ics…A rational actor takes into account all available information and picks the best means of accomplishing her goals…To be rational, one must act upon ade-quate information to maximize one's own perceived utility unencumbered by re-lationships with other people and free of any other cognitive biases or limita-tions.”); see also Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New Behavioral Law and Economics Movements, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 973, 976 – 77 (2003) (explaining that rational actors are expected to pick a course of action that produces that greatest possible utility). 
75 See Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 999 – 1000 (1995) (explaining that the con-cept of rational actors can be expanded through the lenses of a family whereby actors bargain and make decisions together). 
76 See Leonce Ndikumana, Financial Determinants of Domestic Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from Panel Data, 28 WORLD DEV. 381, 381 (2000) (noting that investment has been shown to be critical for economic development); Jan Misun and Vladimir Tomsik, Does Foreign Direct Investment Crowd in or Crowd out Domestic Investment?, 40 E. EUR. ECON. 38, 42 (2002) (“It is generally accepted in the economics literature that investment is a key variable determining economic growth”).  Economies develop when the private sector invests.  For instance, a firm that endeavors to open a large factory must often contract local construction firms to build its installation.  This usually employs local workers to staff its oper-ations, who then spend their earnings on local goods and services.  This infusion of capital starts the “multiplier” effect, wherein the same dollars are reused many times, benefitting numerous people and, in effect, growing the capital beyond its 
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sions to invest are neither random nor constant,77 the potential for economic growth is maximized when laws and institutions en-courage people to invest resources.78  Depriving women of eco-nomic rights has the reverse effect by (1) incentivizing those who would prefer to invest to approach the market overly cautiously, (2) reducing the sum of investable property, (3) discouraging women from investing their sparse resources, and (4) eliminating efficient checks and balances on spending and investing. For example, because investment is inherently a gamble—as those who put up capital always risk losing some or the entire principal—the likelihood that one invests depends upon how much one stands to lose.  The greater the potential harm, the less likely an investor proceeds.79  This is particularly true for those with scant expendable incomes.80  If a man’s spouse and family are 
                                                                                                                                    
face value.  The value of a unit of currency can thus render greater benefits than its face value if spent in a vibrant market place.  It is also true that actors can elect to not invest or recycle their money, rendering the opposite recessional effect.  Ul-timately, actors have the option of spending money or saving money.  When money is saved, the supply of available capital on the market diminishes.  Should enough money not be invested, it can become scarce to the point of causing eco-nomic retraction.  
77 See Ndikumana, supra note 76, at 397 (suggesting that States with efficient institutions incentivize investment and, in turn, development).  For example, countries with highly developed banking industries, legal systems, skilled work-ers, and sturdy infrastructure reduce transaction costs and increase an invest-ment’s rate of return.  See, e.g., Stephen Knack & Phillip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL. 207 (2006) (discussing the importance of property rights for invest-ment and growth).  On the other hand, De Soto’s seminal research on lesser-developed countries found that underdeveloped institutions suffocate investment.  For instance, underdeveloped land titling and registration institutions prevent land “owners” from proving that they do, in fact, own their land.  Assets without clear title cannot be leveraged as collateral to secure a bank loan.  Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in The West and Fails Every-where Else, at 40 (2003) (“Without this legal framework of property rights people can effectively do business only with those whom they know or their family.”). 
78 The process by which a sum of money invested is worth more to the firm and target society than its face value is known as the “multiplier.”  William J. Baumol & Alan S. Binder, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, 180 (8th Ed. 2001). 
79 See Nathan M. Jensen, NATION-STATES AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 2 – 3 (2006) (demonstrating that investors prefer to pursue foreign direct investment opportu-nities in democracies because they provide a safer, less-risky terrain than autocra-cies). 
80 See Samuel L. Popkin, THE RATIONAL PEASANT, 18 (1979) (finding in a study of rural Vietnam, that those in poorer regions consider, and engage in, investment 
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entirely dependent upon his income, the sole male wage earner will likely engage only in overly conservative economic activities since a bad investment could devastate his family.  For example, women in developing nations are commonly forced to work in the non-wage earning agricultural sector.81  In these societies, families perceive potential investments as being costlier than those living in societies where secondary sources of incomes lessen the risks of a failed investment, depressing the rate of investment.  Limiting female economic rights also creates few incentives for women to build wealth.  Discriminatory intestacy and inheritance laws, for instance, disincentive women from engaging in wealth creation since women cannot directly receive or retain earnings rendered in the event of their husband’s death.82  Likewise, women have less incentive to become a small business owner if their hus-bands can claim and control the resulting revenue.83  Said differ-ently, discriminatory laws encourage women who would other-wise become active in the market to forebear, considering that they can only reach a small portion of a transaction’s benefits.  And those earnings can be claimed and squandered by her husband.84  Thus a rational actor accounting for her own, or her family’s, best interest will have little reason to risk scarce assets when the cost of investing outweighs any limited, expected returns, discouraging greater market activity.  
                                                                                                                                    
opportunities like in Western countries.  Indeed, actors engage in economic trans-actions when the investment should render adequate returns, considering the na-ture of the risk.  Naturally, “peasants” are more likely to forebear from investing when resources are scarce because of the increased risks). 
81 See, e.g., Megan Berry, A Woman’s Worth: Accounting for Women in the Global Market, 37 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 465, 473 (2009) (stating that because women in African often are not given education or job training, often the only opportunity women have to earn money is through the informal agriculture market). 
82 See Jelili A. Omotola, Primogenture and Illegitimacy in African Customary Law: The Battle for Survival of the Culture, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 116 (“Primo-geniture has been in existence in Africa since the early times.  It permits only male issues to inherit the property of a person who dies intestate.”). 
83 See Michael Kevane, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: HOW GENDER WORKS, 31 (2004) (stating that women “who want to become an entrepreneur will think twice.  Her husband will have first rights to all of her profits.”). 
84 See, e.g., Sihlongaonyane, C.N. 470/2013A, at 8 – 9 (discussing a Swazi common law rule which identifies the man as the sole administer of marital prop-erty). 
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A third factor is that when women lack economic rights, half of the population is functionally barred from investing.85  Seminal re-search by the economist Hernando De Soto found that lesser de-veloped countries are impeded from developing due to the amounts of “dead capital” found therein.86  De Soto’s primary the-ory concerns the lack of written land titles in developing countries, which prevents landowners from proving good title.87  Absent proof of ownership, landowners can rarely obtain loans and thus invest, resulting in stunted development.88  In a similar fashion, customary law bestows women a right to license land for the pur-poses of farming and cultivation, but bars outright ownership.89  And without the right to alienate land, all land controlled by wom-en is removed from the marketplace,90 diminishing a country’s overall sum of investable assets and attendant rate of investment.91  In other words, permitting women to occupy and use land, but barring outright ownership, acts as a market regulation stunting investment without providing a reciprocal benefit. Furthermore, it appears that providing women with at least some authority over family income serves as a check and balance on spending, which helps to cultivate economic growth.  Commen-tators note that, in societies harboring severe gender inequality, women are more likely to spend resources on socially productive goods and services (when given the ability to spend resources).  The common explanation is that since women are more frequently tasked with household chores, agricultural production, and child rearing, they invest in goods benefiting the entire family.92  Like-                                                          
85 Sawaya, supra note 54. 
86 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 40 (2003) (“Dead Capital exists because . . . converting a physical asset to generate capital—using your house to borrow money to finance an enterprise, for example—requires a very complex process.”  However, “80 percent of the world is undercapitalized; people cannot draw economic life from their buildings (or any other asset) to generate capital.”). 
87 Id. at 153 (“Nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system.  The problem is that most citizens cannot gain access to it.”). 
88 Id. at 40. 
89 Lastarria-Cornhiel, supra note 46, at 1321. 
90 Nyamu, supra note 20. 
91 De Soto, supra note 86. 
92 See Shana Hofstetter, The Interaction of Customary Law and Microfinance: Women’s Entry into the World Economy, 14 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 337, 341 (2008) (“[G]ender creates a difference in the range of social benefits accruing from 
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wise, research also suggests that men are more likely to spend money on goods benefiting solely themselves.93  In fact, men are probably more likely to spend family money on capricious activi-ties precisely because women lack a vote, veto, or even voice.  Thus expanding the range of family actors who can control resources from beyond men to also their wives—who generally serves as a proxy voice for their children—increases the socially beneficial us-es of family resources.  
3.2. The Case of South Korea 
 This truism’s corollary is also accurate; encouraging women to become full players in the marketplace can unleash a nation’s full economic potential.  In South Korea, for example, economic growth overcame poverty only after women entered the market.94  As background, during both Korea’s Chosun period (1392-1897) and Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), women were subjugated, as pov-erty and inefficiency prevailed.95  Korea historically adhered to a Confucian culture emphasizing namjon yobi, or “honored men and subservient women.”96  A strict legal hierarchy resulted in which 
                                                                                                                                    
the loan . . . [F]amilies benefited more when the women controlled the loan mon-ey.  Loans to women have a greater impact on household expenditures and the education levels of female children.  Child survival increases twenty times more and child nutrition improves by 4 to 8% more than with loans to men.”). 
93 See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 483, 504 (2002) (“Women often enhance the welfare of the family if given control of the family finances.  Studies have shown that husbands often keep up to 90% of their earn-ings for their own consumption, while a wife and mother would likely spend the majority of her earnings on the children.”). 
94 Many factors can be credited for Korea’s growth and most of them are not unrelated to each other.  To be sure, democratization, export-focused trade policy, and the later investment in human capital were important.  However, the growth of Korean investment in relationship to the rise of women as economic actors is remarkable and informative.  
95 See CHARLES R. FRANK, JR ET AL., SOUTH KOREA 8 (1975) (describing South Korea’s porous economic condition).  Michael L. Ross, Oil, Islam, and Women, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107, 109 (2008). 
96 Hyun-key Kim Hogarth, Globalization and Women’s Property Rights in South Korea, 10 PERSP. ON GLOBAL DEV & TECH. 137, 143 (2010): 
Women have long held a low social status in Korean society.  Until re-cently the concept of namjon yobi ̆ (honoured men and subservient wom-en) was so firmly embedded in Korean people’s psyche, both male and 
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women were seldom considered independent people.97  Women had to obtain their husband’s or male relative’s permission to enter most commercial transactions and other legal arrangements.98  And akin to African customary law,99 women were excluded from the wage-earning workforce, relegated to the primary sector (i.e., agri-culture).100  While a man could control and collateralize marital as-sets, women lacked the right to inherit101 or own personal proper-ty.102  Upon gaining independence after World II, South Korea pro-moted manufactured exported goods in hopes of reforming the country’s stagnant economy.103  The demand for labor grew as fac-
                                                                                                                                    
female, that it provided a simple explanation for the severe gender ine-quality that has prevailed in all sectors of society.  It was derived from the Confucian ethics and cosmology, which governed every aspect of daily life during the Choso ̆n dynasty (1392 – 1910).  Under Confucian-ism, woman had no rights to own or inherit property, which meant fi-nancially she had to depend on her father before marriage, her husband after marriage and her eldest son after her husband’s death. 
; DONG-SOOK SHIN GILLS, RURAL WOMEN AND TRIPLE EXPLOITATION IN KOREAN DEVELOPMENT 103 (1999). 
97 Ross, supra note 95, at 109 (“At the turn of the twentieth century, Korea had a highly patriarchal culture: females were not given their own names, girls were separated from boys beginning at age 6, and women were not allowed to enter the streets of Seoul during the daytime.”). 
98 GILLS, supra note 96, at 103 (remarking that women “were required by law to obtain the ‘permission’ (not consent) of their husbands for their public activi-ties, for example, for employment.  Any legal arrangement by a wife would be nullified if it was not ‘permitted’ by the husband.”). 
99 See Pierre Brochu & Louis-Philippe Morin, Union Membership and Perceived Job Insecurity: Thirty Years of Evidence from the American General Social Survey, 65 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 263, 267 (2012) (stating that the primary sector (i.e., agricul-ture) is where most African women today work.  The economic emphasis of most developed countries lies in the “tertiary sector” (or service sector), where skilled labor works in industries such as health care, communications, and education). 
100 Kyung Ae Park, Women and Development: The Case of South Korea, 25 COMP. POL. 127, 132 (1993) (“[T]he proportions of women employed in the primary, sec-ondary, and tertiary sectors in 1963 were 69, 7, and 24 percent, respectively.”). 
101 Hogarth, supra note 96, at 143 (“the law of succession established by the colonial government revoked the previous rights of inheritance for women . . . The modern law of succession under the colonial government, however, preclud-ed female members of the household from any right to inheritance.”). 
102 See GILLS, supra note 96, at 103 (“while men possessed legal rights to man-age, use and even take profits from a wife’s property, a woman required her hus-band’s consent even in the disposal of her own property.”). 
103 See Jennifer L. Porges, The Development of Korean Labor Law and the Impact of the American System, 12 COMP. LAB. L. 335, 337, 351 (1991) (chronicling the severe economic and infrastructure problems plaguing South Korea, which improved 
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tories were built,104 which, due to the male population’s decline in the Korean War,105 opened factory doors to women.106  This caused the textile and clothing industries—also known as the “female manufacturing industries”—to boom, increasing the number of women in the workforce by over 50% from 1960 to 1980.107  As Ko-rean output increased,108 for the first time, women became econom-ic actors, achieving degrees of legal protection.109  Women then sought to harness their money’s economic potential, prompting fe-male mutual finance associations and other organizations to emerge.110  And now, in modern times, Korean women often control their family’s finances with primary decision-making authority over budgeting and investment,111 leading experts to predict that the manner in which women invest will direct the Korean economy.112   Importantly, the entrance of Korean women into the market-place substantially altered and improved the country’s economy.  
                                                                                                                                    
during Korean industrialization when the country sought to promote export manufactured goods). 
104 GILLS, supra note 96, at 8 (1999). 
105 Hogarth, supra note 96, at 143 – 44. 
106 Ross, supra note 95. 
107 Park, supra note 100, at 132 (noting that the ‘female manufacturing indus-tries’ included “textile and clothing manufacturing, rubber and plastics, electronic goods, shoes, and china and pottery manufacturing.”). 
108 Id. (“female manufacturing industries were responsible for 70 percent of total national export earnings in 1975; about 80 percent of the women in the man-ufacturing sector produced export-oriented products in the 1970s.”). 
109 Barriers to female activity have been largely replaced with government policies designed to encourage female contributions to the marketplace.  For ex-ample, the Korean legislature guaranteed women full inheritance rights in 1990.  Hogarth, supra note 96, at 146. Additionally, the Gender-Equality Act in 1987 promised equal employment opportunities regarding recruiting and promotion; Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, A Reversal of Fortune for Korean Women: Explaining the 1983 Upward Turn in Relative Earnings, 46 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 727, 728 (1998); see also Suvendrini Kakuchi, Despite Gains, South Korean Women Still Struggle for Equality, IPS (June, 29, 2010), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51994 [https://perma.cc/LMQ4-ZGPJ] (“South Korea also has a law that re-quires the government to support women entrepreneurs and extend financial subsidies to career-interrupted women who want to engage in economic activi-ties.”). 
110 Hogarth, supra note 96, at 145 (“Korean women have learned about the power of money in the modern times through experience, and have become ob-sessed with money, seeing it as a means to achieve their liberation.”). 
111 Id. at 144. 
112 Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, supra note 109, at 727 (“[W]omen’s invest-ment choices will, in turn, affect the future productivity of Korea’s economy.”). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
1208 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37.4 
Keeping in mind that investment and credit is critical for growth, as female economic activity increased, the amount of domestic credit in private and public sectors grew.113  The private sector alone is-sued twice as much credit issued from 1960 to 1967.114  Likewise, in 1970, only 12.1% of South Korean GPD was in private investment, but by the early 1980’s, the rate grew to 22.2%.115  By the mid-1990’s, over a third of Korea’s GDP was being reinvested.116  Nota-bly, these development sparked South Korea’s historic develop-ment; the country climbed out of crippling poverty in the 1960s to currently the world’s 13th most productive economy.  But as soon as women become marketplace players, the amount of private eco-nomic activity began to boom suggesting that the cost/benefit analyses of families were changing.  It thus seems that, not only are systemic inefficiencies created by gender discrimination, but equal-ity erodes many incentive-based obstacles to investment.117  In the next section, we demonstrate this empirically.  
4. EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 From a research design viewpoint, our analysis is intended to explain whether a significant, causal relationship exists between poverty and sex discrimination—and if so, its nature.  There is the possibility that poverty and gender inequality are statistically un-related and thus have no effect on each other.  Likewise their con-nection could also be “spurious,” meaning that neither phenome-non is causing the other despite appearing correlated.118  For 
                                                          
113 See YOUNG-IOB CHUNG, SOUTH KOREA IN THE FAST LANE: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 43 (2007) (describing Korea’s strategy at the implementation of its new economic plan to increase investment levels: “[t]o modernize the economy and maintain overall sustained growth at a rapid rate—the country’s primary economic goals—South Korea needed large amounts of in-vestment and the ability to allocate them to meet the nation’s economic goals.”). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 52. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 43. 
118 See, e.g., Alissa Pollitz Worden, Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies & Elizabeth K. Brown, A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public Defense Across American States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1423, 1436 – 37 (2011) (providing an example of a spurious relationship for which can be compensated using control variables.  Here, the research studies the relationship between quality of representation and 
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instance, the presence of antiquated and inefficient institutions—which are prevalent in developing nations119—could be the actual cause of both poverty and discrimination.120  If this were the situa-tion, then the assumption that sex discrimination is neither causing nor caused by poverty would prove accurate.  But it is this article’s contention, as described in our law and economics analysis, that gender inequality depresses investment and other important mar-ketplace activities, causing underdevelopment.  This is what our empirical analysis is structured to affirm or refute.  
4.1. Research Design 
 We constructed a dataset to investigate the causes of poverty by combining data provided by the World Bank’s World Devel-opment Indicators121 and the CIRI Human Rights Data Project.122  Our unit of analysis includes every nation in the world from 1981 to 2011.123  Our primary expectation is that sexist laws frustrate the manner in which people invest, leading to poverty and underde-velopment.  In light of this theory, we performed two statistical models, the first of which tests the relationship between sexist laws and investment (Model 1) and the second measures sexist laws and poverty’s relationship (Model 2).  In other words, our analysis uses two separate dependent variables, one for each of the two models since we are seeking to understand the causes of both.  Independ-
                                                                                                                                    
the nature of the defendant, noting that the type of crimes for which some de-fendants are more commonly arrested can produce a spurious relationship). 
119 See Phillip J. McConnaughay, The Scope of Autonomy in International Con-tracts and Its Relation to Economic Regulation and Development, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L 595, 601 (2001) (defining what constitutes a “developing nation” as a country that lacks institutions that can perform effectively or as intended). 
120 See Kenneth U. Surjadinata, Revisiting Corrupt Practices from a Market Per-spective, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1021, 1071 – 72 (1998) (remarking that investors tend to avoid investing in developing nations due to their inefficient institutions). 
121 Wbopendata: Stata module to access World Bank databases, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/developers/apps/wbopendata [https://perma.cc/9LZD-DEJN] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
122 Data & Documentation, CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data-documentation.html [https://perma.cc/5TGL-4NMP] (last visited Feb. 26, 2016). 
123 Note that the Women’s Social Rights variable extends only to 2005, as it was discontinued by CIRI after this year.  Note also that data was not available for every nation in every year. 
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ent variables are all of the factors that might affect, or cause, a de-pendent variable to change.  Here, sex discrimination is the prima-ry independent variable because we are hypothesizing that sexist laws have a powerful yet understudied relationship with the de-pendent variables, poverty and investment.  Thus, our statistical analysis seeks to explain whether there is a relationship between sexist laws and both poverty and investment—and if there is such a relationship, its nature and magnitude. To accomplish this goal, our empirical analysis is designed to isolate the relationship between poverty and sex discrimination.  This isolation is important because unrelated variables can appear related if the research design fails to include whichever variables are actually causing the relationship.  For example, the sale of ice cream and crime are correlated, but not because ice cream causes people to break the law.  Instead, hot weather causes the rate of both to rise, making ice cream and crime appear linked.  To avoid finding such a spurious relationship, our statistical models include numerous independent variables (i.e., control variables) that might be influencing poverty and/or underdevelopment.  After control-ling for these other causes, if sex discrimination appears strongly related with poverty and investment, then we can deduce that they are actually related to a certain degree of statistical certainty.  In fact, we can assume that one variable is likely causing the other.  The first model’s dependent variable reflects changes in in-vestment, which is measured by the Domestic Credit to the Private Sector provided by Banks.124  This variable is critical because our the-ory suggests that sexist laws depress the rate of investment (lead-ing to poverty).  Studying the effects of gender discrimination on investment thus provides necessary insights into its ultimate rela-tionship on poverty.  The second model’s dependent variable is poverty/development (or lack thereof), represented by Per Capita GDP.  This is because we are suggesting that sexist laws ultimately produce poor economic performance, which can be captured by Per Capita GDP.  Each dependent variable is drawn from World Bank data. The primary independent variable, women’s rights, is measured by the degree of liberty (or lack thereof) that women enjoy in the 
                                                          
124 Domestic Credit to the Private Sector measures financial resources pro-vided to the private sector by deposit taking corporations other than central banks. 
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public spheres of a given nation.  This variable is derived from a dataset by Cingranelli, Richards and Clay, who compiled the Ci-gnarelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.125  We drew three independent variables from the CIRI dataset—Women’s Economic Rights, Women’s Political Rights and Women’s Social Rights—which are all coded on a scale of zero (from least protective of women’s rights/most hostile to women) to three (women granted full and equal access to the same rights and privileges as men).126  Women’s Economic Rights per country includes such factors as “equal pay for equal work,” “free choice of profession or employ-ment without the need to obtain a husband or male relative’s con-sent,” and “the right to be free from sexual harassment in the workplace”.  The variable is coded within four categories.  The first pertaining to economics rights: (0) There are no economic rights for women under law, and systematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into the law.  (1) There are some economic rights for women under law, but these rights are not effectively enforced (2) Women had some economic rights under law, and the gov-ernment effectively enforced these rights in practice while still al-lowing a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters. 
                                                          
125 The CIRI dataset was created using data from the United States Depart-ment of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  The Human Rights Reports provide detailed information about the worldwide status of women, amongst other human rights concerns, allowing Cignarelli, Richards, and Clay to perform a content analysis of each country’s treatment of women.  FAQ, CIRI HUMAN RIGHTS DATA PROJECT, http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/faq.html [https://perma.cc/9J4D-LJ55] (last visited Mar. 12, 2015).  Note that for rights dealing with freedom from extrajudicial killing, disappearance, torture, and polit-ical imprisonment, CIRI also utilized Amnesty International’s Annual Report.  However, our article does not make use of these CIRI variables. 
126 Women’s Economic Rights and Women’s Political Rights run from 1981 – 2011.  Women’s Social Rights runs from 1981-2005.  We thus look at the entirety of 1981 – 2011 in the two models we run using Women’s Economic Rights and Women’s Political Rights as the independent variables, and examine only to 2005 in the models that utilize Women’s Social Rights and the additive Women’s Rights variable. 
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(3) All or nearly all of women’s economic rights are guaranteed by law.  In practice, the government fully and vigorously enforces these laws in practice.127   The second, women’s Political Rights, includes rights such as the right to vote, the right to join political parties, and the right to run for and hold elected public offices.  The variable is coded as follows: (0) Women’s political rights were not guaranteed by law dur-ing a given year. (1) Women’s political rights were guaranteed in law, but se-verely prohibited in practice. (2) Women’s political rights were guaranteed in law, but were still moderately prohibited in practice. (3) Women’s political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice.128 Women’s Social Rights is a catch-all category containing a number of rights including rights relating to family law such as the right to initiate a divorce and the right to inherit property as well as freedom from genital mutilation, freedom from forced steriliza-tion, and the right to travel abroad.  This variable is coded as fol-lowed: (0) There were no social rights for women in law and that sys-tematic discrimination based on sex may have been built into law. Women had some social rights under law, but those rights were not effectively enforced. Women had some social rights under law, and the government effectively enforced those rights in practice while still allowing a low level of discrimination against women in social matters. All or nearly all of women’s social rights were guaranteed by law and the government fully and vigorously enforced those laws in practice.129  We then created an additive variable, combining all three vari-ables into one, more universal, Women’s Rights variable.  As previously mentioned, statistical models can misrepresent a studied relationship (e.g., finding that a strong relationship be-
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tween two variables exists when they are, in fact, unrelated) if the researcher omits the actual causal variable(s) from the study.  To avoid this error, we added control variables, such as Democracy.  This is substantially important control variable because democracy is considered a prominent causal force in inciting development.  Research has found that economies grow better in democracies be-cause foreign investors feel more secure investing in democracies, the nature of democratic governments provide more public goods, and local leaders are less likely to steal or otherwise be corrupt.130  We were thus concerned that a women’s rights variable would act as a proxy for democracy, rather than control for an independent effect of female discrimination.  This study’s democracy variable was adapted from the Polity IV dataset.  Countries received scores ranging from 10 (perfect democracy) to -10 (perfect autocracy).  The variable was calculated by measuring certain qualities that are common to either government type, such as the range of freedoms that one has or the amount of checks and balances on the executive branch leader. We also control for several economic variables.  For example, high inflation diminishes investment because market confidence decreases when their money’s value drops relative to the goods and services they seek to purchase.  Others lose resources neces-sary to invest when inflation increases.131  Therefore, we added a variable from the World Bank, GDP deflator, reflecting the rate of inflation.  Similarly, we considered variables pertaining to the availability of credit, including domestic credit provided by the finan-cial sector, domestic credit to private sector by banks and domestic credit to private sector by financial corporations because—all things being equal—investment should be greater when capital is cheaper.132  
                                                          
130 See Jensen, supra note 79, at 2 – 3 (noting that foreign investors are more likely to prefer investing in democracies); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, & James D. Morrow, THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL (2004) (discussing that democracies incentivize the creation of public goods and other behaviors that encourage economic growth and development). 
131 See Ndikumana, supra note 76, at 382 (“External debt, public sector bor-rowing from the domestic financial system, the black market premium, and infla-tion negatively affect domestic investment.”). 
132 See William J. Baumol & Alan S. Binder, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICY, 164 (8th 2001) (“The real interest is the determinant of investment . . . When interest rates rise, investment falls, and it is not hard to see why.  Business-es must borrow to finance most investment, and the interest rate dictates how much firms must pay for that privilege.”). 
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Also considering that consumer and investor confidence likely play a strong role in individual investment behavior, we included a variable for GDP growth.  Indeed, people are more willing to risk their money in the market when the market seems filled with promise.133  To account for the overall robustness of a country’s GDP we accounted for GDP in current US Dollars. Additionally, international economic phenomena can infuse capital and thus create growth.  For instance, countries that are more tied into the world’s economic system are more likely to de-velop at a steady rate in line with world growth.  The corollary is also true that more isolated nations tend to experience difficulties developing.  Thus we included several international variables, such as a country’s receptiveness to international trade (or economic openness), measured by trade as a percentage of GDP.134  We added a handful of additional potentially causal variables, such as central government debt (percentage of GDP) since govern-ment spending can crowd out domestic investment.135  Keeping in mind the uniqueness of oil producing states, we added a variable measuring a nation’s oil rents as percentage of their GDP.136  Final-ly, as a proxy for industrialization and stability, we included a var-iable measuring the infant mortality rate.  It is critically important to control for this concept since women’s rights is likely linked to de-velopment.  Thus it would be problematic to measure women’s rights without adding a control for a nation’s level of development.  Our model controls for the passage of time using the variable years since it is possible that most states have seen improvement in their infrastructures and economies in the past several decades.  As a result, we want to make sure that whatever results we see are be-ing driven by how each state treats citizens on the basis of gender, not merely a general influence of modernization. 
                                                          
133 See Ndikumana, supra note 76, at 397 (stating that “per capita GDP growth and international trade flows have positive effects on domestic investment.”). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 384. 
136 This is because oil deposits give oil states a lucrative source of revenue of-tentimes insulating them from the typical effects of poverty on development.  A classic example is Saudi Arabia, which has a high per capita GDP, yet low levels of democracy, education, and other social development indicators.  Indeed, with respect to development and women’s rights, the oil industry has been shown to render unique results.  See Ross, supra note 95 (finding that many of the conclu-sions that scholars have made about Islam’s effect on women is likely caused, in-stead, by the oil industry). 
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We tested the time series data using a heavily modified version of an ordinary least squares (“OLS”) analysis.  Oftentimes, OLS is the appropriate test for linear relationships (such as this).137  For the present study, though, a modified version of OLS is the proper statistical tool, since the analysis of large collections of data span-ning many years is not without risks.  Indeed, the models use what is known as time series data, which contains a series of observa-tions collected over a period of time.138  One of the benefits of a time series model is that it cannot only accurately pinpoint past in-stances of a nation’s economic fortunes waxing or waning when women gained greater liberty and freedom, but it also provides more accurate and predictive models.139  Some of the potential problems with this model include hetereoskedasticity140 or data that is “trended” too strongly with the passage of time.  This occurs when a studied relationship (e.g., the connection between sexist laws and poverty) changes over the years; if the world is generally treating women better and becoming richer—although the two 
                                                          
137 To be more specific, it is appropriate for a linear relationship without mul-ticollinearity.  A linear relationship exists when the relationship can be represent-ed by a straight line, as in every unit input has the same output.  Multicollinearity is a problem whereby the independent variables are related to each other, which skews results. 
138 Time series models are used in a variety of fields that endeavor to track a phenomenon over the course of years.  For instance, time series models first gained prominence in forecasting economic conditions.  See generally John R. Freeman, Granger Causality and the Time Series Analysis of Political Relationships, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI., 327 (1983); Charles I. Jones, Time Series Tests of Endogenous Growth Models, 110 Q. J. ECON. 495 (1995).  More recently, they have also been used in such diverse areas as mapping recidivism rates and, in a particularly novel case, to map the rate of African American and Hispanic enrollment in medical and law schools.  John Gruhl & Susan Welch, The Impact of the Bakke Decision on Black and Hispanic Enrollment in Medical and Law Schools, 73 SOC. SCI. Q. 485 (1990); Majib Ba-ni-Yaghoub, J. Paul Fedoroff, Susan Curry & David E. Amundsen, A Time Series Modeling Approach in Risk Appraisal of Violent and Sexual Recidivism, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 349 (2010). 
139 See Bani-Yaghoub et al., supra note 138 (stating that a “prediction of tem-poral variations of an observation is a natural ability of time series modeling”). 
140 Heteroskedasticity is the phenomenon of a variable’s variability (or the range of values within that value) being unequal over the range of the variable being used to predict it.  This occurs when the standard deviations of a variable are non-constant over a period of time.  Linear regression models, including mod-els centered on OLS regressions, assume normal distribution of standard errors.  This means that OLS models run using hetereoskedastic data can produce results with biased standard errors.  While one need not disregard all results drawn from such models, it is safe to say that one should approach drawing conclusions from OLS models run with heteroskedastic data with caution. 
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events are unrelated—then we must statistically account for this possibility.141  Thus we modified an OLS regression using quadrat-ic regressions, which statistically isolate our variables from the general trend of time; or, one could say we made them station-ary.142  We then ran a series of statistical treatments on our data, controlling for the effects of heteroskedasticity and time-dependent effects oftentimes plaguing time-series data.  We then needed to add additional statistical steps in order to alleviate any concerns that we were drawing inferences from biased results.  In order to remedy this situation, we included the Huber-White estimator of variance in our models and obtained robust (heteroskedasticity-consistent) standard errors.143  These empirical methods rendered powerful deductions, which are likely undistorted by intervening variables and the passage of time.  
4.2. Results 
 Our results are strong and promising.144  In interpreting these results, the coefficients indicate the direction and magnitude of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, and the R-squared identifies the statistical strength of the entire mod-
                                                          
141 Said differently, it is possible that certain results are being driven by a cumulative effect caused by the passage of time. 
142 To make our data stationary, we tested each of our variables using quad-ratic regressions, to see which variables contained time-trend patterns.  We then detrended those variables and produced predicted values.  These predicted varia-bles were predictions of the value of each variable, divorced from the trends caused simply by the passage of time. 
143 Dursun Peksen, Does Military Intervention Help Human Rights?, 65 POL. RES. Q. 558 (2012); Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Es-timator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 871 (1980).  This additional step will allow us to better trust the results of our models, and thus draw more accurate conclusions from those results. 
144 Women’s Rights was found to be strongly statistically significant in the predicted direction with each of the two independent variables.  Even controlling for other factors that can, and do, spur economic growth, we can see that the more rights women have in society, including full participation in the marketplace and full protection of the law, the greater the wealth per citizen in society.  Similarly, the more women are viewed and protected as full participants in the marketplace, the greater the sums of money that banks will be willing to provide as credit to the society.  Our other independent variables generally likewise perform in pre-dicted directions.  For additional information, please see the appendix to this piece. 
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el.145  In the first model [See Table 1], we find that women’s rights was significant on societal levels of investment, which is a key de-terminant of poverty.  Indeed, women’s rights was significant at better than a .01 level, meaning that there is less than a one percent chance that this statistical relationship is coincidental.  This also indicates that as women gain rights, the level of investment grows.  The converse is also true; throughout the years, a diminishment of women’s rights leads to significant reductions in national levels of investment.  We tested this proposition among all countries—both developed and developing—and many years.  This model also con-trolled for most intervening factors that could muddle the analy-sis.146  In fact, most control aspects of development were found to be significant in the expected directions.  Of special importance was the fact that women’s rights remained significant even after controlling for democracy and the proxy for development.  This suggests that the status of women has a very special effect on in-vestment that can be separated from other things often related to 
                                                          
145 The degree of significance of each variable is reflected by the number of asterisks attached to the coefficient.  A statistically significant relationship indi-cates that—to whichever degree reflected by the asterisks—the two variables are correlated by some level greater than chance.  They, in fact, likely have a causal relationship.  Whether a coefficient is positive or negative represents the direction of the relationship; for example, a positive coefficient between women’s rights and investment indicates that increasing women’s rights leads to greater investment (while a negative coefficient would mean that increasing women’s rights depress-es investment).  The results were instructive.  
146 Natural resources, openness to trade, a growing economy and credit pro-vided by banks and the financial sector are all significantly and positively associ-ated with a high per capita GDP.  We also see infant mortality significantly and negatively correlated with per capita GDP.  This, too, stands to reason as a nation with a robust economy will have those conditions necessary to ensure the health and well-being of those newly born.  The fact that debt has no significant relation-ship with per capita GDP is also rational.  The past several decades have seen both nations with thriving economies and nations with weak economies accumulate debt or engage in deficit spending.  As a result, there should not be a strong rela-tionship between these factors. 
 One puzzling relationship is that between the per capita GDP of a nation and the amount of domestic credit to the private sector.  It could be that in a more healthy economy, the financial sector and banks are contributing capital to the private sector, while in a less healthy state we see alternate entities, such as for-eign exchange companies and private, non-bank money lenders, engaging in the lion’s share of lending practices.  The significant, negative relationship between trade and the amount of credit provided by banks may require further analysis, as other indicators in Model 1 do perform in expected directions.  In sum, this analy-sis suggests that, similar to the Korean case study, investment is substantially hindered when women are unable to exercise the same economic rights as men. 
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more egalitarian societies.  It thus seems clear that oppressing women substantially affects economic behavior, promoting pov-erty and underdevelopment.  Adding confidence to our study was that the model’s overall strength was strong and the control varia-bles acted as expected. Also importantly, in the second model, women’s rights was sig-nificantly related to poor economic performance.  We assumed that this would be the case since depriving women of fundamental rights harms investment.  But it seemed important to run these tests proving the second step, stunted growth and poverty, actual-ly follow.  Indeed, our second model’s results clearly indicate—at a high level of statistical significance—that sexist laws actually cause poverty by undermining efficient economic behavior.  These find-ings should contribute to the prior understandings of gender ine-quality. It can also be argued that the impact of improving women’s economic or legal standings in a nation is unlikely to have an im-mediate impact on a nation’s economic wellbeing.  In other words, it will take time for the changes in the legal protection of women to impact a nation’s economic fortunes.  To address this concern, we ran the models again, but this time adding a lag to our independ-ent variable of interest, women’s rights.  Model 3 uses Per Capita GDP as the dependent variable, while model 4 uses Bank Credit.  These models continue to affirm our original theory.147  Thus, our research seems to support the theory that developing countries are often mired in poverty precisely because they enact and enforce sexist laws—rather than female subjugation being an unfortunate byproduct of poverty.  
5. POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 This article’s findings suggest that sexist laws must be re-formed in order to catalyze development and economic growth.  This is, with little doubt, a difficult task.  Societies progress in slow, 
                                                          
147 These models, too, are derived with robust standard errors.  Each model continues to perform in accordance with our hypotheses. A noteworthy change does take place in model 3; infant mortality rates, already significant using the un-lagged women’s rights additive variable, has become more strongly so, from proving significant at the .10 level to being significant at the .05 level. 
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path-dependent ways.  The inertia of change is often predicated on what previously occurred.148  Thus societies only rarely evolve in ways that are in contradiction with the recent past.149  However, like in the example of South Korea, sometimes an event, new poli-cy, or phenomenon sparks change.150  Thus, the challenge is to find policy proscriptions that can reverse the course of women’s eco-nomic rights.  The South Korean case study suggests that even moderate in-creases in women’s rights can improve the economy.151  Indeed, the entrance of women into the wage-earning sector was empowering since an earned income, despite its meagerness, provided women with the capacity to participate in the market.  Korean women eventually took control over home finances, built investment net-works, and catalyzed South Korea’s growth through investment.  A study of the garment industry in Bangladesh reached similar conclusions.  Historically, Bengali women were largely barred from the wage-earning sector, considered dependent upon their husband or other male relative for financial caretaking.152  But after the rise of the female manufacturing industries, “[t]he most fre-quently cited benefit of their employment from their personal per-spective related to the greater sense of self-reliance it gave them, the lessening of the burden on their families and their ability to stand on their own feet.”153  This suggests that increasing the rights and roles of women in the workplace often inspires women to par-ticipate in the market.  And by incentivizing women to grow as economic actors, the economy can be expected to follow suit.  Furthermore, some organizations in lesser-developed countries issue microcredit, which are small loans bearing minimal interest rates.  A study of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh found that par-
                                                          
148 Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 6 – 9 (1990) (explaining that institutions and societies often develop in path dependent ways). 
149 Id. 
150 Supra notes 94 – 117 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra Section 3.2 (using South Korea as an example to illustrate the re-lationship between economics and gender inequality).  
152 See Naila Kabeer and Simeen Mahmud, Globalization, Gender and Poverty: Bangladeshi Women Workers in Expert and Local Markets, 16 J. INT’L DEV. 93, 1085 (2004) (“[S]ociety . . . defines men as the primary, and even sole, breadwinners and privileges male access to employment, women historically have been defined, and have experienced themselves, as dependents.”). 
153 Id. 
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ticipating local women generally experience social and economic empowerment; “as the number of years of borrowing increased, not only did women's income rise, but women also increased their negotiating skills, social network affiliations and knowledge—all of which enhance decision-making abilities.”154  Importantly, the bank’s lending structure grouped women together, which formed investment networks and developed a culture of investment and empowerment.155  Interestingly, women are more likely than men to invest in socially useful activities, as the education levels, espe-cially amongst young girls, increased in these women’s villages.156  Though microcredit foundations are not without problems and critics,157 case studies from Bangladesh, Cameroon158 and else-where support the Grameen results, suggesting that female in-vestment networks have the potential to erode social stigmas and barriers that have limited female economic participation.  Another suggested method is that educational programs can help subjugated women to understand the various methods avail-able to assert constitutional protections or other rights.159  In fact, 
                                                          
154 Alexandra Bernsek, Banking on Social Change: Grameen Bank Lending to Women, 16 INT’L J. POL., CULT. & SOC. 369, 377 (2003). 
155 Id. at 378 
156 Id. at 380. Hofstetter, supra note 92 at 341. 
157 See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 266 (2007) (discussing how the Grameen Bank may actually be making worse some of the problems it seeks to cure); James D. Greenberg, Microfinance, Law, and Devel-opment: Case Study in Mali, 30 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 135, 160 – 61 (2013): 
Poverty is a complex phenomenon, and solutions to it are unlikely to be found solely in neoliberal faith in free markets or the power of entrepre-neurial spirit.  When we look at real people making livings in real places, such as Mali, the limitations of microfinance as a solution become all too apparent.  Due to drought, flood, locust, and economic shocks, liveli-hoods are already risky.  For credit to make a difference, the return on investments must generate not merely enough to pay off principle and interest, but to turn profits.  If investments fail to do this, then a loan be-come a liability, a debt that must be paid by other means. 
158 Lotsmart Fonjong, Fostering Women’s Particpation in Development through Non-Governmental Efforts in Cameroon, 167 GEOGRAPHIC J., 223, 228 (2001). 
159 See Sawaya, supra note 54, at 329 – 330 (“[I]n order for women in Sub-Saharan Africa to exercise their economic rights effectively, they need to challenge not only the structure, substance, and application of the law obstructing their abil-ity to assert their rights, but the culture which prevents them from exercising their rights. Rights education programs are the most effective means of assisting wom-en in the development of capabilities . . . ”). 
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some women may be, in part, self-excluded from the marketplace if they rarely receive messages suggesting that their involvement is socially appropriate.  Thus education programs are possibly a nec-essary first step to overcome such economic barriers.  This process could be especially influential if women are inspired to take a more prominent role in the marketplace. Other potentially effective ideas include subsidizing childcare, as has been done in Colombia.160  This provides women, who are often tasked with primary parenting responsibilities, the capacity to participate in market activities, especially outside of the home.161  Another issue concerns the manner in which women are more like-ly to suffer from certain medical and health issues.162  In fact, ele-vated health related issues are seen as a general impediment to Af-rican development, though women seem to disproportionately suffer.163  Recognizing and improving women’s health issues in developing nations is an objective that can be pursued by both lo-cal and international actors.  Also suggested is that promoting primary and secondary education in girls—a rate that is very low in developing nations—can help inspire confidence and ability to demand and exercise economic rights.164  Furthermore, the most difficult, though likely effective, goal would be to increase female representation in government.165  Currently, in most developing 
                                                          
160 See Ana Revenga & Sudhir Shetty, Empowering Women is Smart Economics, 49 FIN. & DEV. (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/revenga.htm [https://perma.cc/B3SS-3NRN]. 
161 Id. 
162 See J.M. Spectar, The Hydra Hath But One Head: The Socio-Cultural Dimen-sions of the AIDs Epidemic & Women’s rights to Health, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 22 – 23 (2001) (discussing the need to “strengthen women’s right to health,” in con-sidering its link to poverty). 
163 Id. at 10 (citing as an example of the disproportionate suffering that “fe-male children are three times more likely to suffer from malnutrition than are male children . . . ”).  
164 See Pauline Rose, Why Girls’ Education Can Help Eradicate Poverty, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2013, 4:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/us-why-girls-education-idUSBRE98O13D20130925 [https://perma.cc/XHQ9-6DSD] (“Providing girls with a quality education also equips them with the confidence to confront people in power and challenge the inequalities that still exist for girls and women worldwide.”). 
165 See, e.g., Khaled A. Beydoun, Fast Tracking Women into Parliament Seats in The Arab World, 17 SW. J. INT’L L. 63, 65 (2011)(“Arab women still find themselves at political point zero, if you will, standing outside the hardened walls of the re-gion's parliaments.  At best, the political engagement of Arab women is meager.  
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countries, women are subjugated because the men make the rules.  However, despite the present barriers to legislative office, it ap-pears that concentrated movements in certain develop countries and regional organizations are increasing female political partici-pations.166  Thus, all things considered, there are a multitude of steps that can be taken to help encourage women’s rights and, in turn, catalyze growth and development.  
6. CONCLUSION 
  This article responds to the phenomenon that sexist laws are more commonly enacted and enforced in impoverished regions.  These types of statutes oftentimes limit the ability of women to participate equally in the workplace and at home.  Some literature assumes that women can expect greater fundamental rights as soon as their region experiences economic development, other works suggest that such development can actually further harm women; this work responded to this debate and addressed ques-tions about the general correlation between sex discrimination and poverty by seeking to understand why gender inequality is com-monly associated with underdevelopment in the first place.  Using a law and economics approach, it was asserted herein that the incentive structures created by sexist laws can offer valua-ble insights into this relationship.  Notably, it was found that gen-der inequality harms the family structure.  This can devastate chances of development because the family structure can be viewed as an effective economic unit, providing incentives for ac-
                                                                                                                                    
Arab women remain effectively disenfranchised from the salient processes that shape governance in their respective states.”). 
166 Aili Mari Tripp, Creating Collective Capabilities: Women, Agency, and the Poli-tics of Representation, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 2019 (2010) (“Women have been integral to efforts to advance themselves in the political arena . . . In various Afri-can countries such as South Africa, Namibia, Uganda, Kenya and Sierra Leone, there are 50/50 movements advocating that women claim half of all parliamen-tary seats.  International and regional bodies, including the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the U.N. Beijing Conference on Women, the Southern African Develop-ment Community (SADC) and others have also encouraged the adoption of measures to promote women's parliamentary representation.  Some regional or-ganizations, like the aforementioned SADC, set targets for their member states: for example, women representatives in SADC member states are to hold fifty percent of legislative seats by the year 2015.”). 
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tors to efficiently engage in the market.  Undermining this nearly guarantees poverty.  Thus development can seem to fail if the ills of gender inequality are made a low priority.  Instead, we find that the act of empowering women can exercise a nation’s economic po-tential.    
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.     
  1 2 
Independent Variables   
Women’s Rights 39.41119*** 28.05303*** 
 (13.34093) (6.376041) 
Oil .2933776*** .0009037 
 (.0326015) (.0133665) 
Debt -.0945822 -.01068077*** 
 (.1023681) (.0397518) 
Trade .0728462*** -.0207998*** 
 (.0180877) (.0058454) 
Inflation .0537509***  .0057595 
 (.0169404) (.0072137) 
GDPGrowth .0495747*** -.0017346 
 (.0179673) (.0067361) 
GDPCurrentUS  .0304031*                   -.0178557*** 
 (.0158829)                                (.0064027) 
NetDomesticCred -.0192364 .0252747*** 
 (.0176823) (.00072905) 
CreditPrivateSect -.1733496*** .9018988*** 
 (.034288) (.0100658) 
BankCredit .2105853***  
 (.0349387)  
CreditFinSec .0547317*** .0029077 
 (.0192123) (.0088637) 
InfantMortality -.1317861* -.0184667 
 (.0720413) (.0266175) 
Year -7.628327** -2.31218 
 (3.477336) (1.408348) 
GDP Per Capita  .0317637*** 
  (0060557) 
Constant 53.78736 -86.11763 
 (74.91095) (26.07593) 
   
Number of Observations 3494 3494 
R-Squared 0.0550 0.8473 
Probability > F 0 0 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
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Table 2.     
  3 4 
Independent Variables   
Women’s Rights 
(Lagged) 33.73373** 29.10194*** 
 (13.52577) (6.615226) 
Oil .2795961*** .0102465 
 (.0329854) (.0135272) 
Debt -.041538 -.0812174** 
 (.1012737) (.0359284) 
Trade .0684233*** -.0220915*** 
 (.0182039) (.005729) 
Inflation .052716***  .0082261 
 (.0171454) (.0071107) 
GDPGrowth .0428638** -.0056666 
 (.0182093) (.0066714) 
GDPCurrentUS  .0311972*                   -.0187319*** 
 (.0160296)                                (.0062911) 
NetDomesticCred -.0229714 .0223271*** 
 (.0178041) (.0070754) 
CreditPrivateSect -.1401564*** .9095722*** 
 (.0359504) (.0097778) 
BankCredit .1848014***  
 (.035112)  
CreditFinSec .0565342*** -.0014364 
 (.0191489) (.0085673) 
InfantMortality -.1996533*** -.0068764 
 (.0732934) (.0269008) 
Year -7.32842** -3.286055* 
 (349622) (1.400131) 




 (78.00897) (26.95648) 
   
   
Number of Observations 3393 3393 
R-Squared 0.0515 0.8536 
Probability > F 0 0 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
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a. Results from unadjusted Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis 
     
  1 2 
Independent Variables   
Women’s Rights 39.41119*** 30.40639*** 
 (14.504) (5.634732) 
Oil .2952402*** .0107739 
 (.327491) (.0127739) 
Debt -.00768 -.073159* 
 (.1019524) (.0397518) 
Trade .0780566*** -.015995** 
 (.0179702) (.0070048) 
Inflation .0529565***  .0068177 
 (.016767) (.0065397) 
GDPGrowth .0587127*** .0023541 
 (.0174961) (.0065397) 
GDPCurrentUS .032018**                -.0160517** 
 (.0161692)                                (0063017) 
NetDomesticCred -.0212622 .0255871*** 
 (0175258) (.0068229) 
CreditPrivateSect -.1801529*** .9031983*** 
 (.0438348) (.0076236) 
BankCredit .2183553***  
 (.0434426)  
CreditFinSec .0496952** .0022935 
 (.0198867) (.0077576) 
InfantMortality -.1200403* -.0135942 
 (.0727445) (.0283763) 
Constant 1528.432 70.17368 
 (112.2698) (43.77973) 
   
Number of Observations 3494 3494 
R-Squared 0.0542 0.8442 
Probability > F 0 0 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01   
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